Quotes of the Week

Week-ending 22 August 2025

“I am in Pre-Trial Detention Center No. 2 in Taganrog. I was supposed to be transferred to Rostov, but at the last minute, my transfer was cancelled without explanation. I am waiting for news like one waits for rain at sea, and I am very worried.”

– Yana Souvorova, administrator of a local Melitopol news Telegram Channel, detained by the Russian authorities in a Taganrog prison since early August

Source: ‘Two years after the roundup of seven Ukrainian media professionals in Melitopol, RSF continues to search for those the Kremlin would like to see forgotten,’ RSF, 20 August 2025

Background from RSF: These few sentences managed to make it through the walls of one of the most feared prisons in Russia, in Taganrog, in the country’s southwest. The administrator of a local Melitopol news Telegram channel, Yana Souvorova, has been detained there since early August. She managed, in a letter, to warn her relatives. It was in this same detention center—known as a site of torture for Ukrainian civilians and soldiers—that Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna was repeatedly abused before dying in Russian captivity in September 2024. On 20 August 2023, in Melitopol in southeastern Ukraine, the Russian occupation forces arrested Yana Souvorova, a 19‑year‑old moderator of the Telegram channel Melitopol tse Ukraina (“Melitopol is Ukraine”), along with six other journalists and administrators: her colleagues Maksym Rupchov, Oleksandr Malyshev, Vladyslav Hershon and Mark Kaliush, as well as Anastasia Hloukhovska and Heorhiy Levtchenko of the Telegram channel RIA‑Melitopol. Detained either in occupied Mariupol or Donetsk, or in Russia, all were thrown into the labyrinth of the Russian prison system. Two years later, RSF takes stock of their situation.

“These seven journalists and media collaborators symbolize what Russia fears most: the truth about the occupation of Ukrainian territories, where arrests and repression have become the norm. Some are awaiting sham trials, while for others, information only comes in dribs and drabs. They must not be forgotten, and the Kremlin must be held accountable for their cases. RSF calls for their immediate and unconditional release.”

– Pauline Maufrais, RSF Regional Officer for Ukraine

Source: ‘Two years after the roundup of seven Ukrainian media professionals in Melitopol, RSF continues to search for those the Kremlin would like to see forgotten,’ RSF, 20 August 2025

Background from RSF: Two years to the day after their roundup in Melitopol, on 20 August 2023, seven Ukrainian media professionals are still being held by the Kremlin in the occupied territories or in Russia. Adjourned trials, deportations, Moscow’s obstinate silence: all have been sucked into the hell of the Russian prison system, making it almost impossible to document their cases exhaustively. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is shedding light on their situation so that they are not forgotten, and is calling for their immediate release.

“[…] Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is not about slices of war-torn land in eastern Ukraine. It is about Ukraine’s democracy. Putin fears that the Russian people will see that democracy as an enticing alternative to his stultifying autocratic rule.”

– Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch (1993-2022), is a visiting professor at Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs.

Source: Kenneth Roth, ‘Trump needs to understand what the war in Ukraine is really about,’ The Guardian, 21 August 2025 [Photo: Wikipedia]

Background from Kenneth Roth: ‘[…] Putin invaded Ukraine to quash its democracy. Unlike the established democracies of Europe, Ukraine looks too much like Russia for Putin to ignore the possibility that Russians will see an alternative future in its accountable, elected government. Like Russia, Ukraine is Slavic and Orthodox. And far from a small statelet, Ukraine, with the second largest population among post-Soviet states after Russia, cannot be ignored. Putin has long preferred Ukraine as a Kremlin vassal state. The Euromaidan protests of 2013-14, which ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych after he suspended talks for a closer relationship with the European Union, led to Putin’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea and parts of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Today, Putin’s most controversial demands would enhance the possibility of Kyiv’s renewed subordination.’

‘As part of Russia’s unconventional war on Europe, the Kremlin’s sabotage operations and campaign of subversion and disinformation, combined with the fullscale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, are integral to its broader hybrid war aimed at undermining the West.’

– Charlie Edwards, Senior Adviser, Strategy and National Security; Nate Seidenstein, Research Assistant

Source: Charlie Edward and Nate Seidenstein, ‘The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure,’ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 2025

Background from Charlie Edward & Nate Seidenstein: ‘While Russian sabotage operations are estimated to have caused hundreds of millions of euros in physical damage (to submarine cables, pipelines, transport infrastructure, etc.), and to some extent psychological harm – by fostering societal anxiety, weakening public trust and exacerbating political divisions – they have yet to be catastrophic. No confirmed civilian deaths have been directly linked to Russian sabotage operations in Europe since the 2022 invasion. It would, however, be wrong to discount the severity of the threat based on the number of civilian deaths, even
if that is a key driver for governments in determining action. The evolving pattern of activity points to a deliberate effort by the Kremlin and the RIS to escalate pressure and uncertainty. The absence of mass casualties does not imply an absence of intent or capability. Rather, it reflects a strategy designed to intimidate, disrupt and probe the resolve of European governments in a manner carefully calibrated to avoid crossing the threshold that would trigger a forceful retaliatory response. Yet the margin for escalation is narrow: a single security lapse could result in casualties. A small number of outlier incidents, most notably the attempted assassination of Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger, point to a more aggressive edge. The targeting of Papperger, and potentially other figures in the defence industry, signals Russia’s intent to strike at individuals linked to Western military support for Ukraine, aiming to destabilise the defence-industrial base supporting Kyiv.’