26 December 2024
by Vic Peterson
Vic Peterson reviews Getting Russia Right by Thomas Graham [Hardback, £23.75, 272pp, ISBN-9781509556892, Polity, Cambridge, UK, 2023]
Getting Russia Right, by Thomas Graham, a senior fellow at The Council of Foreign Relations, is an incisive analysis of the US-Russia relationship and how we arrived at our present crisis. While crafted for policy wonks, there is sufficient traction in the ideas that Graham can communicate his premise to lay readers: the US is largely to blame for the current miserable state of US-Russian relations. The two countries were not destined to be foes. Rather, significant illusions nurtured by the US tried to shoe-horn the Post-Soviet sphere into a free-market model. The tradition of authoritarian governance runs too deep.
Given its history, how can the US foster a more realistic and effective engagement with Moscow? Graham identifies three key factors that have led to current tensions and proposed strategies for a more constructive future. The main points highlighted include:
U.S. Responsibility in Deteriorating Relations: Graham argues that the United States bears significant responsibility for the decline in U.S.-Russia relations. He contends that American policymakers, deluded by post-Soviet Russia’s initial weakness, failed to recognize Russia’s enduring self-perception as a great power with legitimate security concerns. This oversight led to policies that disregarded Russia’s national interests, contributing to the current adversarial relationship.
Misguided Integration Efforts: The book critiques the U.S. strategy of attempting to integrate Russia into the Western liberal order as a free-market democracy. Graham asserts that this approach was incompatible with both American and Russian national aspirations and policy imperatives. He suggests that the U.S. commitment to this integration, coupled with actions that hedged against Russia’s great-power ambitions, ultimately undermined the potential for a genuine partnership.
Recommendations for Future Policy: Graham advocates for a reassessment of U.S. goals and limitations in dealing with Russia. He emphasizes the importance of treating Russia as a great power and framing the rivalry in terms of geopolitical competition rather than an existential battle between good and evil. By adopting a more pragmatic approach that acknowledges Russia’s national interests, the U.S. can work towards more constructive and stable relations.
Russia’s history is fraught with a dynamic of expansion and contraction in power and in territory. According to Graham, Russian geographical idiosyncrasies ensure a need to have an ever-fluid buffer zone to protect the central regions, whether lead by Czar, Soviet, or Strongman. Regions like Ukraine, Crimea, and others will always be “in play” in the eyes of many Russians, who see the past as a mystical guarantor of dignity. It also bakes in hypersensitivity around status and respect. Understanding this basic premise, Graham implies, can unlock a productive future.
On the surface, the incoming Trump administration would resemble Graham’s pragmatic view. Russia should not be treated as an existential threat, but a global partner. But if past statements on Russia are of any value, Trump will be driven first by his belief his personal relationships with world leaders, Putin in particular, allow him singular insight. He, alone, will outperform the military, diplomatic, and economic elites. Second, for Trump, international state relationships are transactional. Wars can be ended “in a day” through territory bargains. Third, flattery of dictators can manipulate Trump and would be exceptionally vulnerable to Putin. Trump’s fawning over Putin is a case in point. Trump craves admiration.
The mix is volatile.
Graham condemns American policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s for its chronic short-sightedness. But the whipsaw of US nationalism orchestrated by Trump is unlikely to end the pattern. Putin wrote an aggrieved manifesto on why Ukraine “belongs” to Russia historically. A US president who has no interest in history cannot be expected to consider a thousand years of Russian self-image in the “art” of his deal.
