30 October 2025
An interview with human rights defender Oleg Orlov
Source: First Department
Human rights defender Oleg Orlov explains why he views Russia as a fascist state, and yet Memorial does not recognise those who take up arms against the state as political prisoners.
Memorial board member Oleg Orlov has dedicated his entire life to the defence of human rights. He documented war crimes committed by the Russian army in both the first and second Chechen wars and continues this work still, in the war against Ukraine. Orlov has repeatedly risked his life for his beliefs. During the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, he agreed to be a voluntary hostage, helping to save over 1,000 lives in the process. In 2024, he was sentenced to two and a half years in a penal colony for an anti-war article he wrote for the French publication Mediapart. On 1 August, Orlov was released as part of a major prisoner swap.
On the Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression, First Department spoke to Orlov about the criteria Memorial uses to recognise Russian prisoners as ‘political’ and why the need for a list of political prisoners if it does not reflect their true numbers. They also discussed why Orlov views Russia as a fascist state and how fascism could persist for decades.
How many political prisoners are there in Russia?
— Memorial’s list of political prisoners includes 1,146 people [as of 30/10/2025]. How reliable and significant is this figure?
— That is our most conservative figure. We at Memorial make no secret of this and always say that, since the very start of our programme, we have maintained very high recognition criteria. If we recognise someone as a political prisoner, it means that we have criminal case files in our possession. It means we have looked into the matter. It means that we have spoken to a lawyer.
—Does that apply to any and all cases?
— Yes, except those brought on patently political grounds, such as ‘discrediting the armed forces’ or ‘fake news’. We don’t even need to look at the criminal case file here, since the charge itself is manifestly unconstitutional. We study all other cases thoroughly.
The main thing our figures show is how the number of political prisoners has grown (the total number of political prisoners has gone up by a factor of 15 in a decade – Note: First Department). This is very important and significant.
But then, we have always maintained that in reality the number of political prisoners is significantly higher still. To illustrate, I’ve been held in several pre-trial detention centres and in more or less every one of them I heard about people you could call political prisoners. Although, their surnames weren’t known.
— What categories of political prisoner do not feature in your list?
— We don’t include those who refuse to serve in the military in our list. Huge numbers of individuals are evading the draft. Many of them are detained and imprisoned. But to recognise someone as a political prisoner under our criteria, the person must clearly state, ‘I don’t want to serve in the army because it’s against my conscience; I don’t want to do so because there is a war in Ukraine’. But if we don’t know why they are dodging military service, we have no grounds on which to include them in our list. Even so, there are thousands of people like that around now.
Furthermore, a huge number of people have been and are being prosecuted in the occupied territories. They are evidently political prisoners, but we know very little about them. When we do find out and we have the information to hand, we include them in our list, but this is only a small proportion, when there are actually thousands of those people as well. All things told, it is safe to say that, at present, there are thousands of political prisoners in Russia.
— Then doesn’t your incomplete list pose a problem? You understand that journalists, researchers, even our descendants, and future historians, will only work with figures you supply. And it will be written everywhere that in 2025 there were 1,146 political prisoners in Russia, when the number is actually much, much higher.
— We can’t be responsible for the incorrect use of data. Any data, from any research, can be used incorrectly. We always say, and we state on our website, that the data isn’t final or accurate.
But data are important, and our lists are important, too, because they show, substantively and convincingly, that the people on these lists are political prisoners. No one can refute this.
That is to say, this is proof that there are political prisoners in Russia and that they are growing in number. We show the categories under which they are being prosecuted and the mechanisms by which this is happening.
If we didn’t compile these lists, no one would do it for us. No single source would take such an evidentiary approach to documenting the practice of political repression in Russia. That’s why our source is important. We don’t mind if others compile their own lists. I mean, OVD-Info has its own lists, to which they apply less rigorous criteria. And that’s perfectly fine. We’re all for it.
Are partisans political prisoners?
— Do you consider those who use force to resist the state political prisoners: those who set fire to military enlistment offices, derail trains, organize attacks on officials, the army, and propaganda?
— There are two options here. Sometimes a person is detained at the border or at the airport for allegedly attempting to join the fighting forces in Ukraine. Very often, this is not even proven conclusively. In such cases, we recognize that person as a political prisoner.
But if a person inside Russia, for example, participated in an assassination attempt or actually flew a drone on an airfield — not accused of being ready to fly such a drone, but actually flew a drone — then we do not have such cases. This is a very important, because we have a clear criterion of the absence of violent crime.
You see, a person who fought or is even fighting in Ukraine, on Ukrainian territory, with weapons in their hands and repelling aggression, is one thing, but a person who participates in guerrilla warfare or sabotage, and in the process people are being killed on Russian territory — such a person, according to our criteria, is no longer considered a political prisoner. I understand that the line here is quite blurred.
— Are there people within Memorial who disagree with this approach?
— Yes, of course. There are very heated discussions about this, including within Memorial. There are many people who believe that those who are imprisoned for setting fire to military enlistment offices should not be included in the list, that in their cases we have violated our criteria. On the other hand, we are criticized for not encouraging or supporting the partisans, because ‘they are participating in repelling aggression.’
— How can people who remain in Russia help political prisoners?
— What I’ll say is not anything new. Donations to proven, reputable groups, and organizations that help political prisoners are the most important thing.
Many political prisoners have their own support groups, and when a new political prisoner appears, new groups appear. They write letters, prepare parcels and packages, and help the family of the political prisoner. And it’s essential to help these families. There are various forms of such assistance.
For example, my wife and other spouses of political prisoners are sometimes invited to go to the theatre to take their minds off things. This is very important help when a spouse is depressed, especially shortly after arrest, and then people come, like-minded people, and say: here’s an opportunity to go to the theatre. Let’s go! This is a very important thing.
In general, there are now many ways to help political prisoners, and almost all of them are safe. We must take advantage of this while we still can. I am very afraid that they [the authorities] will shut them down.
Is there fascism in Russia?
— By the way, why, in your opinion, do the Russian authorities react with repression to people who hold anti-war views? Propaganda often cites the example of the United States, which has also started many wars. But we know that the largest demonstrations against these wars have always taken place in the United States itself. And nothing happened — the state did not collapse. Why is it different here?
— Excuse me, but that’s a rather ridiculous and naive question. I answered it in the article for which I was imprisoned: because we have a fascist state.
There are, indeed, different types of states. For example, in Iran, you can be executed for something that in Germany, where I am now, would not result in any punishment at all. There are democratic countries, and there are dictatorships. There is respect for freedom of speech, and there is, as in our country, a complete denial of freedom of speech.
Let’s remember our recent past: the First Chechen War, the Second Chechen War. There were mass protests in Russia, there were anti-war committees, ‘Soldiers’ Mothers’ actively resisted conscription and the sending of conscripts to Chechnya. We wrote about all this, we travelled to Chechnya. I myself went there.
We collected data and published reports. I personally gave Putin a report on massive human rights violations in the Chechen Republic by the Russian armed forces. And he took the report. And read it. Times were very different then.
Yes, the country was sliding toward authoritarianism, and terrible crimes were being committed, for example in Chechnya. But the country was not totalitarian. And in the 2000s the fascist regime had not yet been established.
— By way of answer, they will say Russia is now waging an ‘existential war for its existence,’ as the official propaganda calls it. And this is not the time for democracy. Even Peskov has already publicly stated that censorship is permissible in wartime.
— Let’s look at history again. World War II. In the US, Japanese people were interned. They were arrested and sent to camps. It was horrific. It was a clear violation of democratic norms, and later the US government apologized to the Japanese community, acknowledging that it was unacceptable. So, yes, of course, democratic countries have violated democracy during times of war.
But the level of suppression of freedom of speech, the level of suppression of all freedoms that we see in Russia was not characteristic of England, the United States, or other participants in that war. It was characteristic of the Soviet Union.
We see different examples of domestic policy in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Ultimately, it all depends on the country and the regime that developed there. World War II was definitely an existential war. It was a matter of the very existence of states — both Great Britain and the USSR. But the states were different. And there is no comparison between the levels of repression practised against their own citizens.
— You use the term ‘fascism’ in its historical sense. What evidence is there that modern Russia is a fascist state?
— In my article, I use definitions that the Russian Academy of Sciences has set in stone. ‘Fascism is an ideology and practice (I would say, and a political regime, well, OK, let it be like theirs — ideology and practice) that asserts the superiority and exclusivity of a particular nation or race, aimed at inciting national intolerance.’ This is the first sign of fascism, according to the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Well, in Putin’s Russia, this is already happening. We oppose the surrounding states. We assert the uniqueness and superiority of our special Russian civilization, as Putin said. Not even culture, but civilization!
We oppose the Western world, which is ‘harmful and bad,’ and ‘bad’ Western civilization. We assert the superiority of ‘our unique culture’ and deny the very existence of the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian people, and Ukrainian culture. This is constantly proclaimed and is happening in practice. Discrimination against the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture is now taking place throughout Russia and in the territories occupied by Russia.
What else does the Russian Academy of Sciences tell us about fascism? That it is ‘the use of violence and terror to suppress political opponents and any form of dissent.’ Well, in my opinion, that’s obvious, isn’t it? We started this conversation with politically motivated prosecutions. Terror and the suppression of any dissent are quite obvious. Directors, poets, and screenwriters are already being imprisoned, and writers’ books are being banned.
Let’s move on. Fascism is ‘the rejection of democracy and the establishment of a cult of personality.’ There’s probably no need to even argue this point. The cult of personality has existed here for a long time, even before the war, and now it is finally, so to speak, set in stone.
Rejection of democracy? Well, of course, that’s happening! This term is used by the official propaganda only in a negative sense. And there is no real democracy, because its essential principles have been destroyed. In Russia, they simply do not exist in political life.
Finally, there is this definition of fascism: ‘justification of war as a means of resolving interstate problems.’ Well, war is going on! Although it is denied that this is a war, we understand that it is a brutal, large-scale war, and it is used and justified as a means of resolving interstate problems. Both between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and the countries of the ‘collective West.’
Here is the justification for stating the fact that a fascist regime has been established in Russia. You can argue with me, you can say that this is a bad definition, which I have encountered, but I was imprisoned for writing this article! Although in the article, I essentially just referred to the academic definition of fascism and suggested discussing what is happening in our country.
And the fact that I was imprisoned is yet another example that we do indeed have a fascist regime. Of course, it does not completely replicate the characteristics of the fascist regimes that existed in the 20th century.
Putin’s regime is fascism of the 21st-century, where information technologies are widely used, but nevertheless, in my opinion, it is fascism.
There is no area of human life where the state does not consider itself entitled to interfere, regulate, and control that life. There is no area of life in which the state has not meddled.
A totalitarian state has formed in Russia that does not tolerate any dissent. This is undoubtedly totalitarianism, but from my point of view, it has many features that allow us to say it is a fascist regime.
— As I understand it, it is precisely the fascistization of Russia that explains why you want Russia to lose the war with Ukraine and Ukraine to win. How do you envision this victory? What exactly are you proposing to wish for?
— Let’s look at things in real terms. It is obvious that Putin’s Russia will not achieve the goals that were set at the beginning of this war. Most of Ukraine will not be occupied; the political elite or political class of Ukraine will not be, so to speak, wiped out; this class will not be replaced by pro-Russian puppets; Ukraine will not become a satellite of Russia, and the Ukrainian people will not recognize themselves as part of the Russian people.
And this is already a defeat for Russia in terms of the real situation. But when I wrote my article, I had something else in mind, of course. I meant defeat in the sense of de-occupation of at least a significant part of the occupied territories.
I am not even talking about Crimea. I am talking about eastern Ukraine. If we return to at least the situation at the beginning of 2022, it will be a significant and obvious military defeat for Russia. That is the kind of defeat I had in mind when I wrote the article. Unfortunately, observing developments on the front lines, I have less and less hope of a victory of that kind.
And if the territories already occupied by Russia remain under Russian control, Putin’s regime will, of course, present this as a great victory. And this will preserve this fascist regime for many, many years to come. And so now we are faced with a very, very sad and bleak prospect. It is significantly worse than the prospect that was opening up and seemed possible when I wrote my article.
— Do you see an alternative?
— Unfortunately, at the moment, I see this bad option as more likely. But, in my opinion, the possibility of victory on the Ukrainian front lines is not yet completely lost.
The main issue is the position of the West. The issue is whether the West is ready to respond to the challenge, in particular by providing the weapons Ukraine needs.
Unfortunately, now, on the eve of elections in both Germany and the US, the Western political class is showing, as it did before the war, an extraordinary cowardice. And this makes that desired victory less and less likely, although it is still possible.
— You have said you give Putin’s regime a maximum of 10 years and expect to return to Russia no later than that. Have you also become more pessimistic on this issue?
I am only talking about probability. Yes, there is now a growing likelihood that Putin’s regime will be preserved for many years — decades — and that after Putin there will be a new Putin.
Remember how in the 1920s emigrants from Russia kept their suitcases packed and waited and said: this horror, this madness cannot continue for long, it will all fall apart, because it cannot be otherwise — and these people kept their suitcases ready to go back for decades. But the madness, the horror turned out to be long-lasting. Unfortunately, I cannot say that that will not happen again.
Translated by Lindsay Munford and Simon Cosgrove
