Leonid Nikitinsky reviews Tamara Morshchakova’s memoir about the Constitution

17 February 2026

By Leonid Nikitinsky

Professor Tamara Morshchakova has presented a book about her work at the Constitutional Court

Source: Novaya gazeta

Leonid Nikitinsky reviews Sud’ya vne zavisimosti [Судья вне зависимости] by Tamara Morshchakova, published by Fond ‘Prezidentsky Tsentr B.N. El’tsina [Фонд “Президентский Центр Б.Н. Ельцина”], 2025


They kept dragging chairs in from somewhere in a nearby hall, but the people kept coming, so that the young people had to stand at the back for two hours. An anschlag. It wasn’t a film star the hall was giving a standing welcome but a lawyer, Professor Tamara Georgievna Morshchakova, who was presenting her book, A Judge Notwithstanding (published by the B.N. Yeltsin Presidential Centre as part of its ‘The 90s: Personalities in History’ series), at the Moscow branch of the same centre.

How does this matter-of-fact lady who always wears the same glasses and who will soon turn 90 draw people to herself so? Not only with her scholarly works, but also with the lectures she gave up only recently for her students at the Vyshka [the Higher School of Economics]. Even in the crowd of autograph seekers surrounding her she looks like an independent maverick. A knight prepared to fight deception in any and all of its manifestations. Of which there are so many in the courts.

Her book, A Judge Notwithstanding, is a memoir on the stated topic. It belongs to the trend for rethinking the 1990s that had its start two years ago with the 10-part documentary film A Past Not Past and Traitors, the highly controversial film by Maria Pevchikh*. Work on Morshchakova’s book in conjunction with her literary editor Tatyana Skorobogatko was going on at the same time. As Lyudmila Telen, the centre’s deputy director, said in her opening remarks, Tamara Georgievna had taken a long time to convince. At first, she considered the book idea ‘immodest’.

Meanwhile, her story about the events of 1991-2002 (when she retired from the Constitutional Court for reasons of age) allows us to look at this and subsequent periods in Russian history through the prism of a single but important institution in the separation of powers: the Constitutional Court [KS]. That KS, which was created in 1991, has perhaps only one thing in common with its present-day namesake: the chairman’s name. But it’s as if Valery Zorkin had been replaced as well. He is not at all what he was in the early 1990s.

At what point did they both—the court and its chairman—cease being themselves? Professor Morshchakova, who was able to remain herself even while going through the ringer, answers this question by her very being.

* * *

In spring 1991, Sergei Pashin, who worked in the president’s State-Legal Administration, drew up two draft bills on a Constitutional Court, and on 12 July the V Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR approved the one that provided for the possiblity of ordinary citizens addressing appeals to the KS. On 29 October, the Congress chose 13 judges from a list presented by Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, including Zorkin, Morshchakova, and others.

Tamara Georgievna describes a meeting between the newly selected judges and Boris Yeltsin, who congratulated them in such a way that in no way would they think anyone was planning to put pressure on them. This promise would not be kept, but subsequently, often finding myself next to Tamara Georgievna, I was convinced that she spoke exactly as evenly with the president as she did with the ordinary tiresome ‘complainer’. Boris Pasternak called this the noble’s sense of equality with every living thing.

The Constitutional Court’s first decision, on 14 January 1992, ruled the president’s decree merging the Ministry of Security (the future FSB) and the Interior Ministry unconstitutional. 

The judges pointed out that, although the configuration of the organs of administration is the purview of the president, this procedure cannot be applied to the security ministries. Boris Yeltsin immediately abided by the KS’s decision and cancelled the decree.

The ‘CPSU Case’, which occupied the KS for most of 1992 (52 sessions), ended in recognizing Yeltsin’s August 1991 decrees regarding disbanding the highest organs of the CPSU, that had substituted themselves for state bodies, constitutional, but unconstitutional regarding disbanding the CPSU’s lower-level cells. This decision did not satisfy either side. On the other hand, over the course of the sessions, unique historical documents were made public that today can be found only in the six-volume Materials of the CPSU Case, which were published soon after the trial.

The ‘CPSU Case’ had been initiated by an inquiry from the Communist deputies, and though there was neither the possibility (nor the desire) to refuse hearing the case, it immediately laid bare the fundamental vulnerability of the court’s positions. No matter how the judges tried to avoid assessing the facts in order to speak only about constitutional norms, that proved impossible in this kind of case. And no matter how they tried to stay ‘out of politics’, politics themselves overtook them.

Today, reading another negative KS ruling (for example, on the refusal to consider the complaint of Lev Shlosberg* and Boris Vishnevsky* on their designation as ‘foreign agents’), we ask whether it is a good thing that the Constitutional Court tries to stay away from ‘politics’, and isn’t this kind of self-isolation from the political scene cunning and cowardice?

But in the years 1991-1993, the KS took shape and issued decisions in an atmosphere of harsh opposition between President Yeltsin and his administration and the majority of deputies in the Congress and Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. It was difficult to be guided by the 1978 RSFSR Constitution then in effect, into which the Congress of People’s Deputies had introduced approximately 400 amendments.

* * *

There is hardly anything personal in Morshchakova’s memoirs, but the personal factor also played its part in the evolution of the KS. For the sake of history rather than squabbling, Tamara Georgievna talks about Valery Zorkin’s role in it during his first chairmanship of the KS from 1991 to 1993. He got carried away with politics, pretending to the role of arbiter in the face-off between the president and the Supreme Soviet, and made public statements that had not been agreed upon by the other KS judges. As Morshchakova said, 

‘the chairman tried to take on the role of decisionmaker of all questions, including the choice of complaints accepted for consideration, and also took upon himself all contacts with other branches of power’.

The political confrontation reached its most extreme on 21 September 1993, when Yeltsin issued decree no. 1400 disbanding the Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Court of the RSFSR and proposing a new Constitution for an all-Russia referendum. That same night—21-22 September—the Constitutional Court held an emergency meeting and issued a decision on the unconstitutionality of decree no. 1400, with four votes against, one of which was that of Tamara Georgievna.

Morshchakova’s argument, set forth in her book, comes down mainly to procedural issues: the session, which was a step toward the president’s impeachment, had been called not at the petition of the Supreme Court but at the court’s own initiative; it had not been prepared for; it came about not according to regulations; and the opinions of the sides had not been heard.

Morshchakova is a stickler for procedure, which is very important for a judge and for stability in general. But in its content, decree no. 1400, like the security forces’ suppression of parliament that followed it, was in fact unconstitutional. This was a revolution. A political action had broken the former legal succession. From the legal standpoint, the state known as the Russian Federation began anew, from scratch, in 1993. From the substantive point of view, Morshchakova believes, Yeltsin’s actions were justified by extreme necessity: this is what lawyers call the infliction of a lesser harm in order to avert a greater one.

In the context of conceptualizing the 1990s, there can and should be a debate about this, and in no case has Tamara Georgievna removed herself from this discussion. Conceptualizing always means rethinking. Today, though, this is historical experience, and nothing more.

The judges of that Constitutional Court not only extracted but also utilized some of this experience. While the court was idle in 1994, they rewrote the draft of a new law on the KS and compiled internal regulations preventing the chairman from usurping bureaucratic power and acting in the name of the court without its explicit decision. This procedure was followed all the way up to the second time Zorkin became chairman, in 2003.

* * *

On 4 October 1993, I found myself in the Constitutional Court, where I went from office to office talking with judges I knew. Each of them had their television on with a live CNN broadcast from the ‘White House’, which tanks were firing on with drill rounds and which was surrounded by a crowd of merrymakers on the New Arbat Bridge. Alongside the Supreme Soviet, each shot seemed to fly all the way here, too, to Ilinka (the court’s move to St. Petersburg would happen 15 years later), where two weeks before the judges had backed the wrong horse.

Yeltsin, in a fit of temper, was ready to get rid of the Constitutional Court altogether, transferring some of its functions to the Supreme Court, but he was convinced to retain the KS after he had stripped it of the possibility of hearing cases on its own initiative and reached an agreement with the courts to replace the chairman, which was not hard.

In July 1994, a new federal law was passed that remains in effect to this day, but with substantive changes introduced into it in 2020, and Professor Vladimir Tumanov became the new KS chairman.

In 1995, the KS received a request from the Federation Council to verify the constitutionality of Yeltsin’s decrees on conducting an armed operation in Chechnya. The Federation Council pointed out (in my opinion, rightly so), in particular, that the use of troops was its prerogative and required the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency in the country. At the time, the KS issued a fairly ambiguous decision which, nonetheless, did not give the Federation Council grounds for impeaching Yeltsin.

Along with issues of this scale, the KS also considered statements of individual citizens, issuing understandable decisions grounded in principle. A clever legal mechanism was devised for this. Transitional provisions of the 1993 Constitution say that Russian laws passed before then can be applied only if they do not contradict this Basic Law. On the other hand, in accordance with Art. 17 of the Constitution, ‘in the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of the human being and citizen are recognized and guaranteed in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law’. This allowed the 1990s-model KS to deem anti-constitutional any acts that contradicted international standards. On this basis, for example, a number of decisions were taken on the unconstitutionality of the institution of the residence permit.

On 2 February 1999, at the request of the Moscow Municipal Court and a number of citizens, the Constitutional Court approved a decision on the impermissibility of applying the death penalty on the territory of the Russian Federation. This measure of punishment can be applied only on the basis of a jury verdict, and at that time this type of court had not yet been created in the majority of Federation subjects. In 2009, the KS confirmed its position regarding the death penalty, however it is retained as a form of punishment in several articles of the Criminal Code and the moratorium can be halted.

* * *

Morshchakova does not comment in principle on KS decisions taken after her retirement in 2002. Nonetheless, her position as a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council (2004-2019), which does not coincide with her former colleagues, in particular concerning the ‘law on foreign agents’, is well known. But it is difficult for Tamara Georgievna to speak about current legislation and practice of recent years in general. Hysterics and buffoonery are not her genres.

Morshchakova has only allowed herself to criticize in her book the amendments made to the law on the KS in 2020. First, there is the one that prohibited judges from publishing their own particular opinions and in general from commenting in any way on decisions taken by the court. The path traveled by the KS over the last 35 years can, thus, be defined as a trend from being fully open to civil society to being fully closed off.

Today, the KS responds to most of the complaints it receives in writing, with so-called negative decisions, and we do not know who writes them, how (or whether) they are discussed, or what opinions individual judges express. 

Most often we don’t even know the judges themselves. These are not the most visible figures in the legal world.

As in the first years of its existence, the sole frontman for the KS is Chairman Zorkin, who within the framework of the legal forum regularly held in St. Petersburg gives speeches with thoughts that are historically interesting but odd for his position.

Let us return to the hall of the Yeltsin Centre’s Moscow branch, though, where at her nearly 90 years the former judge is answering admirers’ questions. The conversation touches not so much on the Constitutional Court, which doesn’t really exist now, as on the legal system as a whole and, in particular, the independence of judges. In any case, no official transcript is being kept.

The audience in the hall is divided evenly in two. On one hand are people of the 1990s, including members of the government at the time; on the other, young lawyers for whom Tamara Georgievna is a living legend and her book is probably read like a fairytale. And we, in talking about her, tried to hold in our mind the comparison: this is how it was, and this is what it has become.

The very fact of Morshchakova’s agreement to work for five years on this book and its publication is testimony to Tamara Georgievna’s optimism. It is founded on the fact that young people came and are asking questions. The Constitutional Court today is a dormant institution, but under certain circumstances it could wake up.


*Added to the ‘foreign agents’ register by the Russian Justice Ministry.


Tamara Morshchakova’s book can be purchased at the Yeltsin Centre’s bookstore.

Translated by Marian Schwartz


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