17 October 2025
A new large-scale trial in absentia poses risks not for the accused, but for their sympathizers who remain in Russia.
By Leonid Nikitnsky
Source: Novaya gazeta
Trials in absentia against individual “terrorists” who are based abroad, such as Boris Akunin*, are no longer a novelty, and on October 14, the FSB promised to put on trial at least twenty-three such “terrorists” headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.*
This threatens to create certain technical difficulties once the case reaches the courtroom: the “aquarium” for the defendants will stand empty – all individuals involved are beyond the reach of the Russian “law enforcement agencies” – yet in front of the empty enclosure, twenty-three lawyers may take their seats, documenting the course of events for their clients.
According to an FSB press release (no other documents are publicly available), the reason for initiating the case was the signing of the “Declaration of Russian Democratic Forces” in Berlin in 2023, as well as the creation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of the Platform of Russian Democratic Forces, which was presented by Khodorkovsky as a “constituent assembly for the transitional period.”
An analysis of the list published by the FSB suggests that most of the individuals involved are connected by their participation in the Anti-War Committee of Russia.** The committee was established in early March 2022 by activists who had found themselves abroad. In January 2024, it was declared an undesirable organisation in Russia, though the current charges of “terrorism” against its members are not accompanied by a demand to declare the committee itself a “terrorist organisation”; for now, the case is concerned only with individuals.
The opening of a criminal case under Article 205.4 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (organisation of and participation in a terrorist organisation) and Article 278 CC RF (violent seizure of power) against Khodorkovsky, Kasyanov*, Kara-Murza*, Yashin*, Guriev*, Aleksashenko*, Lukyanova*, Shenderovich*, Shulman*, and others involves their inclusion in the list of terrorists and extremists, along with the freezing of their accounts in Russian banks even before a court verdict has been reached. However, almost everyone on the list are seasoned “foreign agents”, who, as of 1 March 2025, are already subject to restrictions on property rights through the “special accounts” procedure (Federal Law No. 520 of December 28, 2024).
Even at the investigative stage, all those involved will be declared internationally wanted, although some of them are already listed by Interpol. However, the chances of them being extradited to Russia are minimal, so long as they carefully choose their places of residence.
Therefore, today we shall not address the nature of the charges against them.
The “Case of the Twenty-Three” creates risks not for the accused, who are abroad, but for those who decide to collaborate with them while remaining in Russia. For regional police anti-extremism ‘E Centres’, it will be tempting to use the same scheme of “terrorist hunting” used for reporting purposes that is currently applied to “extremists” prosecuted for donations to the Anti-Corruption Centre [FBK]*** (see more details of this on the website entry from August 21).
The first thing to understand is this: under the label of “terrorism” (but not “undesirability”), it is not the Anti-War Committee itself that is considered toxic, but rather its members listed in the decision to open the case (which, so far, can only be judged from the FSB press release).
Second: these risks do not take effect from the moment the case is initiated, but from the moment a court verdict enters into legal force. This won’t be delayed, but constructing and reviewing a case against 23 or more defendants, with roles assigned among them, will nevertheless require a certain amount of time, even in their absence.
The third and important point to understand is: that what has been described in the previous two paragraphs is theory. How things will unfold in practice, no one can say today.
Therefore, before clicking the “Join” button on the Anti-War Committee’s website, one should think carefully, so as not to end up, for example, being charged under Article 205.2 CC RF for public justification of terrorism.
But those who have already done so should not panic – while there is a possibility that the relevant lists could leak, the recognition of the “twenty-three” as terrorists will not have retroactive effect – at least, that has been the established precedent in cases involving donations to the FBK.
Since 1 September, Article 13.53 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offenses [CAO RF] has also been in effect, concerning the “search for and access to materials known to be extremist, including through the use of software and hardware tools…” (the law on VPN). In practice, “extremist materials” will almost certainly be treated the same as “terrorist” ones, meaning, therefore, that using a VPN to deliberately access publications by the “terrorists” from the list of twenty-three could also entail certain risks.
In conclusion, the author asks that this note not be regarded as a “justification of terrorism,” as it merely contains warnings for those who might inadvertently end up supporting someone from the “twenty-three.”
*Listed by the Russian authorities as “foreign agents.”
**Declared undesirable organisations within the territory of the Russian Federation.
***Recognized as extremist organisations, whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation.
Translated by Annabel Pedgley
