Dmitri Makarov: Another Chance for ‘Helsinki from Below’? Reviving OSCE-Related Human Rights Groups

11 March 2022

by Dmitri Makarov, Council member, Moscow Helsinki Group. Contact: orlovets at gmail dot com

Source: Dmitri  Makarov,  ‘Another  Chance  for  “Helsinki  from  Below”?  Reviving  OSCE-Related  Human  Rights  Groups,’  IFSH  (ed.),  OSCE  Insights  7/2021  (Baden-Baden:Nomos, 2022)

Republished by kind permission


The OSCE faces a rift in understanding among participating States concerning its role, with the human dimension emerging as a main victim of this crisis. During the Cold War, the Helsinki movement put human rights at the centre of the Helsinki process. Its actions influenced international  politics  and  gave  relevance  to  human  rights  principles.  Yet  the  movement  subsided at  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century,  unable  to  respond  effectively  to  the  authoritarian backlash,  suffering  from  the  “NGO-ization”  of  human  rights  activism,  and  turning  its  focus towards the EU and the Council of Europe. Despite these developments, there have been examples  of  creative  and  mission-driven  transnational  cooperation  within  the  OSCE  area.  Drawing on  these  examples,  this  paper  argues  that  the  OSCE  can  become  more  relevant  if  a  renewed Helsinki movement takes centre stage.


The  Helsinki  movement  began  as  disparate    monitoring    efforts    by    citizen groups    but    soon    developed    into    a transnational advocacy network that gave relevance  to  human  rights  (HR)  principles.  Although  many  Helsinki  committees   continue   their   work,   the   united movement didn’t survive into the twenty-first  century.  Another  Helsinki-inspired  wave  came  in  the  1990s  with  the  peace-oriented    Helsinki    Citizens’    Assembly movement,  which  also  made  an  impact but  failed  to  sustain  itself.  The  global trend  of  “NGO-ization”  shifted  the  focus to  professional  litigation  and  advocacy,and  the  authoritarian  trends  and  restrictive policies of governments pushed most HR groups into a defensive mode.

Among     human     rights     defenders (HRDs)  there  is  little  sense  of  a  joint movement   seeking   to   bypass   divisions across Europe. Also lacking is a common language   as   priorities   diverge,   project thinking   dominates,   and   solidarity   is more  symbolic  than  effective.  Many  groups,  especially  from  the  post-Soviet space, have expressed frustration over the narrow  scope  of  solidarity  actions.  These actions  are  often  limited  to  statements expressing  concern  and  detailed  reports documenting  HR  abuses,  which  remain mostly  unread  due  to  their  length  and the  jargon  they  use.  While  OSCE-hosted forums  such  as  the  Human  Dimension Implementation  Meeting  offer  access  tocivil  society,  the  potential  impact  of  HR groups  has  been  impeded  by  modes  of thinking  and  functioning  that  centre  on particular  problems  rather  than  creating parallel  and  alternative  solutions.  Drawing  on  the  history  of  the  Helsinki  movement   and   recent   examples   of   transnational  activism,  this  paper  argues  for  a shift  towards  greater  cooperation  and  assistance across borders. OSCE-related HR groups  should  develop  a  common  language  and  agenda  based  on  internal  demands  for  justice  and  equity  in  societies throughout  the  OSCE  space  and  should encourage  a  transnational  community  of supporters.

The  paper  first  presents  the  historical roots   of   the   Helsinki   movement   and changes  following  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  It  continues  with  a  critical examination  of  the  role  of  HR  groupsworking  alongside  OSCE  institutions.  It then reflects on examples of transnational cooperation,  including  joint  responses  to crises  and  common  efforts  to  rebuild  the movement.  The  paper  closes  by  proposing  steps  for  strengthening  and  supporting such cooperation.

The birth and transformation of a movement

In his 1975 Nobel lecture, physicist and HR activist Andrei Sakharov proclaimed that peace, progress, and HR are inextricably  linked, such that it is impossible to achieve one if the other two are neglected. [1]  International security,  he proclaimed,  is  inconceivable without  an open society with freedom of  information,  freedom  of  conscience,  the  right  to publish, and the right to travel.

On  12  May  1976,  at  a  press  conference  at  Sakharov’s  apartment,  the  establishment of  the  Moscow Group of Assistance  in Implementation of Helsinki Accords, soon to be known as the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG),  was  announced. Led by Yuri Orlov, who brought forward the  idea of  public monitoring of compliance with the Helsinki Act, the MHG would  go  on  to  spark  an  international movement. [2]  The  founders  of  the  movement  ended  up  in  prison  or  in  exile,  but Helsinki   groups   and   committees   were formed  in  other  countries  –  first  in  former  Soviet  republics  and  then  in  Western states. The US Helsinki Watch group, founded  with  the  participation  of  Lyudmila  Alexeyeva,  an  exiled  member  of  the original  MHG,  would  later  become  Human Rights Watch.

An  attempt to bridge  the  divisions  in Europe  following  the  fall  of  the  Berlin Wall  led  to  another  wave  of  the  Helsinki movement called  the Helsinki  Citizens’ Assembly (HCA). The HCA was a forum where civil society groups from both East and   West could exchange experiences, discuss common concerns,  and  formulate joint strategies. [3] The driving force behind the movement was solidarity among intellectuals from East and West who sought to assist civil society initiatives in difficult spaces. The movement saw the formation of groups in countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Moldova, and the Yugoslav successor states, some of which would become areas of frozen or open conflict. The HCA mainly worked on peace issues and people-to-people diplomacy, but some groups took up HR advocacy, becoming vocal participants in national HR communities in countries such as Armenia and Turkey. However, the movement subsided at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

As states from the former socialist block increasingly joined other European organizations, most HR groups shifted their attention to either the EU or the Council of Europe. The EU leveraged great financial and political power, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) soon became one of the most effective international judicial mechanisms for addressing HR violations. Engagement with these organizations was the preferred option as it seemed more likely to lead to long-lasting democratic change. As a result, many Helsinki committees departed in their own directions, providing expertise at the national level, focusing on litigation (primarily at the ECtHR), or working towards reform that would bring countries closer to EU membership. Others focused on conflict resolution and reconciliation in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet space.

Although most kept the HCA name,many groups lost contact with othercommittees. Some met periodically, butcommon campaigns became rare. In thelate 1990s, the International HelsinkiFederation, established in 1982 in solidar-ity with Soviet dissidents, found itselfcompeting for funds with local groupsand focusing much more on its ownorganizational support than on its mis-sion. [4] Its Vienna-based secretariat filed forbankruptcy in 2008 following a scandalinvolving the misappropriation of fundsby its financial manager. [5]

An effort to revive cooperation ledto the launch of the Civic Solidarity Platform in 2010. The Platform has 100 member organizations and serves the important functions of coordinating different groups (including through joint monitoring and solidarity missions), encouraging the formulation of statements on emerging issues, and general coordination with international bodies. Despite its initial promise, however, it has fallen victim to the same shortcomings as other large international NGOs – dependence on bilateral funding, Western domination, ineffective decision-making structures, and expertise-driven legitimacy as opposed to constituency legitimacy. The participation of most groups has been limited to attending the annual meeting and signing public statements.

The international reaction to HR crises has lacked impact, mostly limiting itself to symbolic gestures and the voicing of concern. There is therefore a need to reform and strengthen HR movements so as to overcome the dangers of authoritarianism, nationalism, and isolationism. As Lyudmila Alexeyeva urged the MHG partners at the annual HR conference just prior to her death in 2018:

We must appeal to people’s values, historical experience, and commonsense. This is very difficult but essential, and if we are convincing, consistent, and firm, success will be on our side without fail. […] When we began our difficult journey for the defense of human rights, we had far fewer grounds for optimism than we do to-day, but we believed in the success of our hopeless cause! [6]

Learning from successful citizen mobilization

There have been efforts by HR groupsto search for alternative, experience-basedsolutions to HR challenges that involveforming a common language and agen-da, building a community of supportfor HR ideas, and proposing actionsfor a wider public. Human rights workmainly remains limited to reporting onproblems and appealing to courts andinternational bodies. It is also heavilyproject-driven and reactive. Nonetheless,there have been initiatives that representsuccessful educational programmes andcitizen-driven mobilizations; such initia-tives point to ways in which HR work can be strengthened.

One such example is the International School of Human Rights, first launched by Marek Novicki of the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in 1990.The educational programmes run by theFoundation greatly contributed to form-ing the new language of HR in the Russian-speaking post-Soviet space. [7] The students of the Higher Course on Human Rights in Warsaw became active across a number of organizations, with some becoming successful HR trainers in their own right. Similarly, the International School for Human Rights and Civic Actions (active from 2008 to 2020), launched by the international Youth Human Rights Movement with the support of the MHG, went on to train a new generation of young HRDs, many of whom became leaders of HR groups in at least nine different countries. These educational initiatives have helped to promote acommon language of HR theory and practice, serving as spaces for exchanging experiences, testing new ideas, building networks, and strengthening solidarity.

Another example of a successful experience-driven movement comes from Belarus. When post-electoral protestsin Belarus resulted in violence in De-cember 2010, Russian and Ukrainian HRDs, many of whom shared commonexperiences at the above-mentioned HRschools, launched the International Ob-servation Mission (IOM) under the aus-pices of the Committee of Internation-al Control over the Human Rights Situ-ation in Belarus (CIC). [8] The IOM was present in Minsk and both monitored and sought to ensure compliance with OSCE commitments. It focused on de-fending prosecuted journalists, lawyers, and HRDs, was present at searches andcourt trials, was in constant contact with local groups, and informed the rel-evant OSCE and UN bodies. The CICworked for several months with no external funding. It nevertheless managed toattract forty-three NGOs, engage morethan seventy-five different people in the work of its bodies, and influence major decisions on Belarus at the time, including the OSCE Moscow Mechanism anda number of UN and Council of Euro-pe resolutions. On a symbolic level, italso drew additional attention to HRin Belarus in countries such as Russiaand Ukraine. It spread the idea of international solidarity and created a modelfor civil society reactions to crackdownsbased on evidence on the ground, drawing from regional experience while re-maining internationally connected. [9] Finally, the Committee created the postof a Special Rapporteur and engaged Neil Jarman, Chair of the OSCE’s Of-fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly, to investigate the events of 19 December 2010. [10] The Special Rapporteur examined the events in the streets of Minsk, which the govern-ment had claimed were mass riots, andsubsequently posed questions to the au-thorities. The report, drawing on thesequestions and other publicly available data, preceded the official OSCE Moscow Mechanism report, which partly drew onthe Special Rapporteur’s conclusions andindicated gross and systematic HR violations. [11] Most importantly, the CIC and the IOM provided examples of engagement and solidarity among HRDs across borders and of support for HRDs on the ground, serving as a guide for action towards accountability during mass HR abuses.

Another model of citizen-driven mobi-lization comes from independent observ-er initiatives in Russia, Ukraine, and Be-larus. These initiatives mainly focus oncourt monitoring (for instance by attend-ing trials to monitor the accessibilityand openness of courts to the public), citizen oversight of law enforcement (byroutinely inspecting police stations andthe work of police patrols), and moni-toring mass rallies. They have formedan international movement of indepen-dent watchdogs and sometimes engagein mediation and crisis prevention. Theseinitiatives base their actions on the HRcommitments compiled in the OSCE ODIHR and Venice Commission Guide-lines on Freedom of Peaceful Assemblyand on methods from the OSCE ODIHR Assembly Monitoring Handbook and Trial Monitoring Manuals, promoting these HR commitments and methods among volunteer observers belonging to the citizen oversight movement. [12]

Citizen mobilization supplements official monitoring performed by ODIHR, which is only open to its staff and to a pool of selected international experts, requires significant resources, and depends on governments agreeing to admit observers, thus making their presence practically impossible in some countries. Civil society groups are able to cover major mass protests and key court proceedings in places to which official OSCE monitors may not have access and in numbers that ODIHR cannot match. They also work primarily with domestic audiences, presenting their own societies with factual reporting and comparisons with the international standards their countries have

Strengthening human rights movements

One of the key purposes of HR groups is to hold regimes that commit grave HR violations accountable. To achieve this goal, HR groups need to solve key social problems and create citizen HR movements. To that end, HR groups need an enabling environment, ample supporters with an understanding of HR, economic sustainability, and financial independence.

There are certain groups that work at the forefront of HR defence. These include journalists, who inform society and shape public debate; lawyers, who must be able to defend the accused without being associated with the presumed crimes of their clients and without fear of prosecution; and HRDs, who must be able to defend the rights of others and be acknowledged as performing a key function in bringing justice to victims and upholding internationally agreed HR obligations. It is no coincidence that these groups are targeted when there are contested elections or mass unrest.

One can argue that an attack on a representative of any of these groups is not an internal matter or a minor violation but a threat to the international system of HR protection. Yet there is no publicly available list of representatives of such groups who have been imprisoned or persecuted for their professional activities; indeed, aside from proverbial statements of concern, it seems that there have thus far been no coordinated efforts on behalf of international organizations to advocate for their release. [13] ODIHR previously engaged in monitoring the situation with HRDs in particular but failed to expand its efforts beyond just a few participating States. [14] OSCE documents are among the few to include additional guarantees on the freedom of movement of HRDs and journalists. [15]

What is largely missing is targeted and practically applicable education on HR and awareness raising that moves beyond the like-minded. Existing higher education programmes focused on HR do not usually include practical engagement in HR work. Higher education programmes rarely include engagement with active HRDs (for example through internships), leading to the distancing of academia from practitioners. This undermines research on HR issues in the most problematic countries. There is also a clear lack of education courses that draw on both the local and the international context, involve experts with field experience, and are available in Russian and other national languages of the OSCE participating States, whether online or offline. More practically oriented HR education could shed light on the situation on the ground and would increase public awareness of HR. Furthermore, promoting the values of HR and the role of HRDs is necessary for strengthening the work of HR groups. Marketing techniques employed in the commercial sector could easily be adapted to serve this purpose. Such communication has received increased attention, with some examples from HR groups potentially serving as inspiration. [16]

Finally, the funding of HR work is often handicapped by the dominance of project-based approaches, dependence on the priorities of donor countries or foundations, and a lack of long-term investment models. For instance, the MHG’s endowment in Russia remains a lone example in the HR sector of the post-Soviet space creating an important and sustainable source of revenue (similar to those enjoyed by universities and other public institutions) and encouraging longterm investment in HR work.[17] Collective community funding as a model also constitutes a major shift toward community philanthropy that could reinvigorate the HR movement. [18] Although socially responsible investment has become more popular among private investors, the only HR group that seems to be building on this is the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). FIDH has created its own ethical investment fund, Libertés & Solidarité, which applies HR criteria in stock selection and includes a mechanism for profit-sharing between the FIDH and subscribers. [19] Thus, further steps are needed to promote the adoption of similar practices in the wider HR community, opening it up both to contributions from large institutional donors and to international crowdfunding efforts that go hand in hand with awareness raising campaigns. Diverse funding provides much more space for experimentation, innovation, and trial and error. Hence, increasing funding diversity and economic sustainability, constructing alternative financial models, and promoting the financial independence of the sector would allow HR work to be more flexible and strategic. [20]

Paying greater attention to these areas would pave the way for broader initiatives that move beyond the usual logic of NGO-focused, project-based work. These would allow HR groups to continue their work on the ground, building on broad-based community support while remaining part of an international movement. After all, this is what the Helsinki movement was always about: a constant reminder that the issues of the human dimension of security are not just points of debate among states but matters of relevance to a wider civil society movement.


The following recommendations are an invitation for HR organizations working in the OSCE region to focus on common priorities. These organizations could encourage OSCE institutions and willing participating States to:

1. Provide support, protection, and an enabling environment for journalists, lawyers, and HRDs, in particular by:

a) agreeing on, compiling, and making publicly available lists of group representatives who have been imprisoned or persecuted for their professional activities, as well as coordinating common actions to advocate for their release in cases of imprisonment;

b) developing responses in cases where members of the above categories face reprisals. Similar anti-reprisal mechanisms adopted by the Council of Europe and the UN could serve as examples for the OSCE to build on;

c) promoting transnational cooperation among civil society, especially in the field of HR;

d) providing political, financial, and expert support for international institutions that focus on these groups, including staff who speak the relevant languages and are familiar with the countries in which these groups face the greatest challenges;

e) bringing together representatives of committed states and civil society experts (i) to classify attacks on journalists, lawyers, and HRDs as egregious disregard for OSCE commitments and as threats to comprehensive security and (ii) to brainstorm ways to counteract and remedy them.

2. Increase the number of supporters and followers of HR groups, including through HR education, in particular by:

a) involving public relations and advertising agencies to help HR activists frame and package their messages, attract more followers, and build communities of support;

b) making support for HR-focused higher education programmes conditional on the active engagement of HR activists and encouraging internships at HR organizations;

c) encouraging international academic exchanges in the field of HR, including internships and collaborative projects;

d) investing in large-scale educational courses for a wider audience (available online and offline) that explain HR concepts and standards in all of the official languages of the OSCE and are supplemented with practically oriented components such as citizen oversight practices;

e) training a new cohort of HR educators who can act as multipliers and build connections and networks both locally and across borders.

3. Re-evaluate the economic sustainability and financial independence of the HR sector. While the risks associated with foreign funding may increase in some states, this should be dealt with not by withdrawing support but by searching for other means of contributing, including directly by citizens. Transnational connections in this context should be encouraged. The following steps should therefore be considered:

a) encouraging the development of various financial models and investment systems for HR work, including endowments, community foundations, impact investment, and crowdfunding platforms;

b) making the mobilization of domestic funding and support a priority while defending the right to receive international funding for HR work.


1 Andrei D. Sakharov, “Peace, Progress,Human Rights”, Nobel Lecture, NobelPrize Organization, 11 December 1975,

2 See Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Paul Goldberg, The Final Act: The Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, New York: William Morrow & Compa-ny, 1988.

3 Ben Schennink, “Helsinki from Below: Origin and Development of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA)”, in: IFSH(ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, 403-415.

4 See Aaron Rhodes, “The Continuing Challenge of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF)”, in: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997, 401-410.

5 Claire Bigg, “Helsinki Federation shutsdown after fraud scandal”, Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, 12 December2007,

6 Lyudmila M. Alexeyeva, “From our archive. Liudmila Alekseeva: ‘We must continue to defend the victims of state tyranny’” (English translation), Rights in Russia, 9 December 2018,

7 Website of the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights,

8 Website of the Committee of International Control over the Human Rights Situation in Belarus,

9 Баранов Константин, Объездчикова Алена. Комитет международного контроля за ситуацией с правами человека в Республике Беларусь как пример комплексной тактики защиты прав человека на пост-советском пространстве. Воронеж: Артефакт, 2012.32 с. [Konstantin Baranov/AlyonaOb’ezdchikova, Committee of Interna-tional Control over the Human RightsSituation in the Republic of Belarus as an Example of a Complex Tactic of De-fending Human Rights in the Post-Soviet Space, Voronezh: Artefact Publishing,2012, p. 32].

10 “Memorandum on the appointment ofa Special Rapporteur on 19 December2010 events”, Special Rapporteur of theCommittee of International Control overthe Human Rights Situation in Belarus,22 February 2010,

11 Emmanuel Decaux, OSCE Moscow Mechanism Rapporteur’s Report on Belarus, ODIHR.GAL/39/11/Corr.1*, 16 June 2011, f / d o c u m e n t s / 6 / b / 7 8 7 0 5 . p d f; SpecialRapporteur of the Committee of International Control over the Human RightsSituation in Belarus, “Final human rights assessment of the events of 19 December2010 in Minsk, Belarus”,

12 OSCE ODIHR, Council of Europe’sCommission for Democracy throughLaw (Venice Commission), Guidelineson Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd edition, Warsaw 2010,; OSCE ODIHR, Handbook on Monitoring Freedom ofPeaceful Assembly, Warsaw 2011, https://; OSCEODIHR, Trial-Monitoring: A ReferenceManual for Practitioners, Warsaw 2008,; OSCE ODIHR, Folke Bernadotte Acade-my, Handbook for Monitoring Adminis-trative Justice, Warsaw 2013,

13 Amnesty International has a slightly broader “prisoner of conscience” designation for those who are imprisoned because of who they are or what they believe. Several groups regularly update lists of “political prisoners” (according to the Human Rights Centre “Viasna”, 907 people as of 6 December 2021 in Belarus alone; see n).

14 OSCE ODIHR, Human Rights Defenders in the OSCE Region: Our Collective Conscience, Warsaw 2007, https://www.o; OSCE ODIHR, The Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Selected OSCE Participating States, Warsaw 2021, 3867

15 See Вашкевич Александр. Стандарты ОБСЕ / под редакций К. Баранова, А. Казлюка // Трансграничные аспекты свободы передвижения: международные стандарты и практические проблемы на примере Беларуси, России и Украины. – Львов: Лига-Пресс, 2015. – c. 44-60 [Alexander Vashkevich, “OSCE Standards”, in: Konstantin Baranov/Alexey Kazliuk (eds.), Transborder Aspects of Freedom of Movement: International Standards and Practical Problems in the Examples of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, Lviv: Liga-Press, 2015, pp. 44-60].

16 See for example the reference to the OSCE ODIHR event “Human Rights Communication 2.0”, Akvarium Klub, Budapest, Hungary, 5 December 2017. See also the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee campaign “For the people”, https:// hc-for-the-people. Further examples include experiments with gaming innovations undertaken by Russia’s non-profit sector (see for instance Tatiana Tolsteneva, “Technology and gaming innovations bring new life to Russian NGOs”, OpenGlobalRights, 12 September 2019, https:/ / y-and-gaming-innovations-bring-new-l ife-to-russian-ngos) and an interactive miniseries with young HR activists as main protagonists (see https://lateralsu, a collaboration between the film studio Lateral Summer, the MHG, and the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta.

17 Website of the MHG’s HR endowment,

18 For example, see references to the #ShiftThePower movement on the website of the Global Fund for Community Foundations, https://globalfundcommun ftthepower/

19 Website of the FIDH, https://www.fidh.o rg/fr/com/faire-un-don/faire-un-placemen t-solidaire-6650

20 See the analysis of diverse financial models in the report by the CSIS Human Rights Initiative: Edwin Rekosh, “Rethinking the human rights business model: New and innovative structures and strategies for local impact”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 14 June 2017, ethinking-human-rights-business-model

Annex: List of active Helsinki groups and committees

Name as of 2021 / Name at creation (if different) / Year of creation / Website

Albania: Albanian Helsinki Committee Albanian Forum for the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms 1990

Armenia: Helsinki Committee ofArmenia1996 Helsinki CitizensAssembly –

Armenia 1992 Armenia: Helsinki Citizens’Assembly – Vanadzor 1998 Helsinki Association ofArmenia1997

Austria: Austrian Helsinki Associa-tion2008

Azerbaijan: Helsinki CitizensAssembly – Azerbaijan1992

Belarus: Belarusian HelsinkiCommittee1995

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (hCa) BanjaLuka 1996

Bulgaria: Bulgarian HelsinkiCommittee1992

Canada: Canadian Helsinki WatchGroup*1985

Croatia: Croatian Helsinki Com-mittee for Human Rights1993

Czech Republic: Czech HelsinkiCommitteeCzechoslovak HelsinkiCommittee1988

Denmark: Danish Helsinki Com-mittee for Human Rights1985

France: European Assembly ofCitizens1990

Georgia: Georgian HelsinkiCommittee*1976–1977

Germany: German Helsinki Com-mittee for Human Rights, Securityand Cooperation in Europe*

Greece: Greek Helsinki Monitor 1993

Hungary: Hungarian Helsinki Committee 1989

Italy: Italian Federation for Human Rights – Italian Helsinki Committee 1987

Kazakhstan: Almaty Helsinki Committee* 1990

Kosovo: Kosovar Helsinki Committee*

Lithuania: Lithuanian Helsinki Group* 1976–1983, reestablished
in 1988

Moldova: Moldovan Helsinki Committee for Human Rights* 1992 Moldova: Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly – Moldova*

Montenegro: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Montenegro

The Netherlands: Netherlands Helsinki Committee 1987

Norway: Norwegian Helsinki Committee 1977

North Macedonia: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 1994

Poland: Helsinki Committee in Poland and Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights Helsinki Committee in Poland 1982, known as the HFHR since 1989

Romania: Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – the Helsinki Committee 1990

Russia: Moscow Helsinki Group 1976, reestablished in 1989

Serbia: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia 1994

Slovakia: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Slovakia 1993

Slovenia: Helsinki Monitor of Slovenia* 1994

Spain: Helsinki España – Human Dimension 1992

Leave a Reply