6 January 2025
by Ed Glezin
Source: Facebook
Mikhail Gorbachev: “I am in favour of fruitful discussion.”
36 years ago, on 6 January 1989, a conference took place in which Mikhail Gorbachev met chief editors, and a number of major figures in Soviet science and culture.
During the conference Gorbachev depicted the USSR’s situation as such: “There is a nostalgic yearning for bygone days; we hear the call for strong leadership. It is said that Perestroika is pushing against the boundaries of what is possible under socialism.
“The communists are being criticised for lacking a plan for Perestroika. Cynics from both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ are rallying together.” The answer is economic reform, accountability, and autonomy.”
“The issue of reforming and determining prices is critical,” says Gorbachev. “Work is underway, and once serious proposals have been made, we will do our utmost to introduce them on a national level. After that will come the reshaping of our public institutions.
It makes total sense for the party to begin its political reforms by reforming itself. Now more than ever, a consolidation of power is required, with the main focus of resolving Perestroika. A lot of responsibility is being placed upon the intelligentsia”.
Literary critic Natalya Ivanova writes, “The intelligentsia, which still considers itself influential, had high hopes for this conference. They hoped that the General Secretary would be informed and enlightened, and that progress would be made towards achieving necessary goals.”
She remembers how Gorbachev expressed himself, particularly on the topic of discussions: “… we welcome them. We are in favour of them… In favour of fruitful discussions”. He stressed (following the famous Pravda article) that, “we still have not mastered the art of cultural discussions”, and joked that “maybe we should apply the principle of unilateral disarmament to our own writers?”
Vitaly Korotich, who attended the conference, pointed out that suddenly “the people began to gain a new trust in the Soviet authorities”. Ivanova remembers that “The editor who came to prominence under Gorbachev pronounced the ritual phrases. Afterwards he, along with the editors of Znamya and Novy Mir, G. Bakklanov and C. Zalygin respectively (the journals’ management changed two-and-a-half years after the conference), the latter a person loathed by the conservatives, launched into an attack and formulated the true cause for the violent rejection of Glasnost: “A whole host of writers are trying to make out the collapse of their hegemony as a tragedy for the entire nation and its system”.
The editor of Molodaya gvardiya, Anatoly Ivanov, made a similar speech. (“It’s obvious that we need glasnost, democracy, and Perestroika as much as we need to breathe”). This was immediately followed up with a disclaimer: “But it’s also obvious that in places emphasis and tone need to be shifted, potentially under the cover of glasnost…” Those who did this ‘shifting’ were then named and shamed for ideological diversion – the press authorities propagating ‘bourgeois and petit-bourgeois viewpoints’: Ogonek, Moskovskie Novosti, and Riga’s Rodnik.
Quarrelling in the presence of the General Secretary is already an open confrontation between different political camps and cannot be mistaken for anything other than a fight.
Sources:
Zagladin, Vadim. A Chronology of the Perestroika, 1985-1991, The Gorbachev Foundation
Ivanova, N. B. The Soviet People’s Deputies’ First Visit: 20 years on”. Readings from Gorbachev. Ep. 7. Moscow, The Gorbachev Foundation, 2010.
An excerpt from Moscow and Beyond: 1986-1989 by A. D. Sakharov
A meeting took place at the beginning of January 1989 (most likely on 6th) between M. S. Gorbachev and a number of intelligentsia representatives: renowned writers, scientists, and artists. Such meetings had already taken place previously, but this was the first time I had received an invitation. Besides Gorbachev, Ryzhkov was also present, but he didn’t speak. Gorbachev began yesterday’s proceedings with rather a long speech. He said that Perestroika will be a most critical period, in which the tasks it poses will require swift solutions without simultaneously being too hasty and skipping over any of the necessary phases. Dangers from the left and right pose an equal threat. Under such conditions, a consolidation of all the nation’s viable forces, united under a shared aim, is required. Diverse approaches to specific issues are permitted and potentially even useful, insofar as they do not lead to dispute or personal enmity. Gorbachev was quite clearly trying to appease different factions within the literary and other cultural domains. However, from the very first speeches given by the Russophile, anti-intelligentsia faction and the ideological opposition, it was clear the conflict had already gone too far to be easily overcome.
The speakers did not limit themselves to cultural issues; they also touched on economic, social, interethnic, and legal matters. A summary of the speeches was later published in the papers, but the most sensitive points—both politically and personally—were left out.
I was planning to speak but hesitated, unsure of what and how to say it. By the time I finally made up my mind, the list of speakers was too long, and I was not given the floor.
Abalkin’s speech painted a striking picture of the economic crisis, ending with the statement: “A cavalry charge against the administrative-command system has failed, and we must switch to a systematic siege.” This phrase was not included in the published report. Abalkin had said something similar at the 19th Party Conference. At the time, I thought his position was too radical and critical for Gorbachev to accept. A few months later, I realised I was wrong.
In his speech, Ulyanov addressed issues related to Memorial, particularly concerning its financial accounts. Viktor Astafyev criticised decrees on rallies and demonstrations, as well as the powers of special troops, calling them anti-democratic and prone to broad interpretation, which could lead to crackdowns on peaceful protests—just as had happened in Minsk, Kurapaty, Krasnoyarsk, and other places. His speech was one of the most significant at the meeting, as it struck a nerve with Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded by citing the events in Sumgait as proof of the need for swift and decisive action:
“We were three hours late in Sumgait, and a tragedy occurred. Workers demand that we prevent anarchy.”
It was clear to me that Gorbachev was conflating two entirely different things—the criminal acts of murder, violence, and atrocities in Sumgait, and the constitutional right to peaceful demonstrations and rallies, which express the people’s will. Without grassroots democratic movements, perestroika is impossible, and there is no reason to fear them. The reference to “workers” was clearly fabricated.
I began making my way toward the podium from my seat in the very back row, hoping to get a chance to speak. But when I heard Gorbachev say, “We were three hours late in Sumgait,” I couldn’t hold back and loudly shouted:
“Not three hours—three days! A battalion was stationed at the bus terminal but had no orders to intervene. Baku is just a half-hour away…”
Gorbachev was visibly displeased by my remark and retorted:
“You must have been listening to these demagogues.”
(He phrased it in such a way that it was initially clear he was referring to Armenian “demagogues,” though he later slightly reworded it.)
I immediately submitted my pre-written request to speak, hoping to address both the decrees and Memorial, but, as I already mentioned, I was not given the floor. An Armenian writer spoke eloquently about Nagorno-Karabakh, while a Lithuanian speaker addressed the issue of republican economic autonomy.
During a break, I approached Gorbachev and Ryzhkov to discuss Armenian-Azerbaijani issues. I emphasised that refugees should not be forced to return home under current conditions, as it could lead to new issues, and I stressed the need to release members of the Karabakh Committee. Gorbachev listened with clear irritation, while Ryzhkov seemed more interested. However, it was Ryzhkov who objected, arguing—like Yakovlev—that it was impossible to interfere with an ongoing investigation. Ryzhkov also mentioned that he couldn’t take me with him to Armenia because it would provoke an undesirable reaction in Azerbaijan (this was in the context of organising aid efforts).
Ryzhkov then mentioned a telegram he had received from four academicians regarding the Volga–Chogray Canal. He was unaware that the canal’s construction would cost 4 billion rubles—he had assumed it would be around 2 billion. I pointed out that if proper filtration was ensured along the canal’s route, which was an absolute necessity from an environmental perspective, the cost would rise even higher.
My entire conversation with Ryzhkov was very amicable.
Ed Glezin invites readers to join the online groups ‘The Era of Gorbachev’s Liberating Perestroika’
📌 Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/152590274823249/
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Translated by Friedich Berg and James Lofthouse
