29 August 2026
Ilya Budraitskis, Ilya Matveev, Russia’s New Imperialism: Capital and Ideology, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. 2026. xii + 228 pp. £19.99. Paperback ISBN: 9781503647732
It’s now 35 years – half a lifetime for many – since the Soviet/Russian Empire began to lose more territory than it gained. Gorbachev is praised by some for initiating this process and berated for doing this by others, but neither Yel’tsin nor Putin have been able to stop this process from continuing. For many (but not all) Russians, Big is Beautiful, so there is still considerable support within their country, despite the tens of thousands of Russian war casualties, for the ongoing attempt to take at least a few more parts of Ukraine, in particular, back under the complete control of Moscow. (I suppose some English people would prefer not to ‘lose’ Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. But would more than a few be willing to go to war to at least try to prevent such a disaster? Many people in Russia, and not only ethnic Russians, certainly were and still are, probably for more than one reason, anxious for Russia to start growing again.) The book reviewed below is one of the very best I have read that devotes its attention to Russia’s ‘size problem.’
Among the many provocative ideas discussed here I would pick out the following.
‘The early 2000s formula placing interests above ideas was replaced by the opposite belief that there is a global struggle of ideas, and national interest is determined by one’s place in this struggle. […] Our argument is that this turn of Russian foreign policy from pragmatism to ideologization was not accidental. Rather, Russia’s transition from its “rational” economic imperialism of the 2000s to the “irrational” ideologically motivated imperialism of 2014 and beyond is part of the same process.’ (p. 39) ‘In our case, the shift of Russian politics from pragmatism to ideologization after 2014 was a transition from a partial to a total ideology.’ (p. 43)
This has resulted, i.a., in some of the top official leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church talking more about sila v pravde (Strength is in truth) than in istina, a more religious concept of truth. The authors claim that:
‘Putin’s personal evolution occupies a special place in the regime’s turn towards ideologization. His structural position as a changeless authoritarian leader who takes control of all key decisions has largely transformed his own worldview toward conspiracy and messianism. In short, Putin’s perception of his own rule as “sovereign” meant rejecting its democratic legitimacy.’ (p. 56)
But (p. 64) has Putin thereby been strengthening or weakening Russia?
‘It is worth adding that the crucial difference between Putin’s historical narrative and the Soviet one is his rejection of the idea of progress.’ (p. 65) ‘He is merely the heir to the same challenges Ivan the Terrible, Catherine the Great, and Stalin all repeatedly faced: overcoming internal centrifugal tendencies, regaining “lost” lands, and acquiring new ones.’ (p. 65)
But has Putin really ‘restored and increased Russia’s relative weight internationally’? (p. 64)
Can Russia be anything but an Empire? Could it be merely a country, admittedly easily the largest in the world? And if that were to be its fate, would Putin have to be regarded as a complete failure who let his country down even more badly than Gorbachev? Must Russia, and not a United Europe, be and remain one of the Big Three? Does Russia at heart belong in and to Eurasia, rather than to Europe? This requires readers (and should have required the authors) to distinguish as clearly as possible between cooperation and collaboration between the West and Russia and between post-Soviet and neo-Soviet Russia (I spotted the former term forty times in this book, the latter not even once). Who could have been, or still be, more ‘Soviet’, albeit in very different ways, than Yel’tsin and Putin?! And why are there so many references in the text to the Kremlin (but only via Putin in the Index) and not a single reference in the Index to the Lubyanka? It’s not clear exactly when the authors think the Cold War ended (under Gorbachev?) and when it returned.
Chapter 4, ‘From Annexation to Invasion’, claims (how convincingly?) that Yanukovych’s decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union rather than the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union did ‘more damage to mutual economic ties than any trade agreement with the EU ever could have.’ (p. 81)
‘Russia has lost territory before, but has got some of it back, and there is no good reason why this should not happen again.’ (pp. 110-113)
‘Russia is “cramped” within its current borders,’ Surkov complained in 2022 (p. 112).
‘The West […] is positioned as a historically unchanging source of existential threat to Russia as a state,’ (p. 113)
The authors conclude that ‘the ideologization of the regime – as well as its imperial ambitions – have been formalized into the fundamental laws of the country.’ (p. 114) For Putin, any ‘negotiations with Ukraine based on the recognition of its national interests are thus simply impossible because they imply the rejection of Russia’s position as a unique civilization, a cultural and historical entity that transcends its current borders.’ Hence, within ‘the worldview of the Russian elite, this war was not only morally justified but also doomed to success, as it corresponded to the true will of the Ukrainian people, conditioned by their history as an essential part of the Russian “country-civilization.”’
The authors conclude that it ‘was and remains a “war of choice” in the full sense of the term.’ (p. 117)
‘The fact that Putin placed the goal of subjugating Ukraine above all other goals and considerations – and was willing to stop at nothing to achieve it – speaks to the subjective and ideological dimensions of the conflict.’ (p. 117) Those ‘who warned against a full-scale invasion could not influence the decision-making process in any way because these decisions were based on an ideological perception of reality instead of on data.’ (p.122)
I would put it rather differently, having visited and talked to people in various parts of Ukraine since 1960 and various parts of Russia since 1959: Putin and some (many?) of his closest colleagues didn’t and still don’t want to go down in history as the rulers of Russia responsible for ‘losing’ Ukraine for ever. (Maybe they will, maybe they won’t.) Could it be as simple as that?
Will Russia ever again be a mere country, rather than one of the few remaining Empires? ‘Imperial nationalism’ (pp. 158-159) is still very strong in Russia, and it will take a long time for many (most?) Russians to accept that they live in a country rather than in something greater than that. With one trivial exception, the authors mention President Trump only in their Epilogue. His re-election, ‘along with the endless noise and drama produced by his chaotic administration, has revealed a paradox. On the one hand, Trumpism is unmistakably similar to Putinism in its ideological content and political style. Both Trump and Putin are mesmerized by the fetish of “sovereignty.” For both of them, “national sovereignty” is a goal in itself, a god […] that requires sacrifices, including human ones. Both revel in nationalist fantasies of restoring past grandeur and reconquering “what is rightfully theirs.” Both resort to emergency politics and the centralization of power.’ (p. 167)
’A new cold war of the Kremlin’s own making is in full swing. Europe is firmly on a path of remilitarization. […] Putin has only himself to blame for this powerful [Western] military build-up. […] Kremlin elites are acting ideologically and are unable to abandon their counterproductive strategy of aggression.’ (p. 167) ‘Censorship is thorough, and there is essentially no space for cultural and intellectual, let alone political, freedoms. [,,,] Without a doubt, some features of Putinism, such as its leader cult, extensive ideologization of society, idea of the nation as an organic entity, and emphasis on external expansion as the only form of state existence, all bring it closer to the practices of various past fascist regimes,’ (pp. 168-169)
And not only ‘past’, but, as the authors are well aware, closer to certain present-day ‘Western far-right ideologies, including cultural pessimism, homophobia and transphobia, conspiracy theories, and hatred toward abstract “global liberal elites”’. (p. 170)
No need to panic, but:
‘[…] it is possible to argue that the [Russian] regime’s fascistization is underway, and it is largely because of its effort to ideologize and reeducate Russian society in the spirit of militarism and imperialist nationalism.’ (p. 170)
While reading this well-written and well-organised book, I happened to read an item in the latest issue of Paul Goble’s roughly twice-monthly digest in English (but always with links to the originals) of fifty recent items on current events and developments in the former USSR. The summary in question here is of an essay by Vasilina Orlova, a Belarusian anthropologist now living in the USA, about how Russian colonialism or imperialism may operate and be explained (away). She offers ten perspectives or angles on how it can manifest itself. Very briefly, with my apologies for oversimplification:
1. Unlike some other empires, Russia expanded much more by land than by sea.
2. Russia tended to expand within its own Russian (rossiysky as well as russky) population.
3. Colonialism by settlers.
4. Russian expansionism differed from other similar developments by involving not so much economic exploitation as by Russification.
5. The Russian Empire has been based less on a racial, biological ideology than on the cultural and religious backwardness of the colonised.
6. The Russian Empire’s gradual, regular, expansion was normal, natural and somehow inevitable.
7. Russian colonialism was and is not so much beneficial economically as essential, in order to provide the Russian State with security from the rest of the world.
8. Russia had and has a ‘hybrid’ empire, and combines elements found in some other empires as well, so it is unique.
9. Russian colonialism is ‘apophatic’, so it isn’t really colonial at all.
10. Russians are themselves the chief victims of having an empire; it’s a heavy obligation and burden, so they deserve to be compensated for this.
This is not an adequate summary of the original text, but it may prompt further discussion.
I’m already looking forward to these brilliant experts’ next book.
