Martin Dewhirst reviews ‘The August Coup: The Destruction of the Soviet Union and The Making of New Russia’ by Robert Service

11 June 2026

by Martin Dewhirst

Martin Dewhirst reviews The August Coup: The Destruction of the Soviet Union and The Making of New Russia, 1985-1991 by Robert Service, Picador, London, 2026.  400 pp.  £30. Ebook: 9781529065794.


GOODNESS! It will soon be 35 years since the end of the USSR and some 40 years since Russia and Gorbachev had a spot of trouble over the appointment of a Russian to a key job in Kazakhstan – in retrospect, a sign of big trouble ahead. However, the USSR had in effect been expanding a bit more by invading Afghanistan in December 1979, and didn’t give up the struggle there until nearly ten years later. Whose side was History on?! (The Russian Federation has restored diplomatic relations with today’s Afghanistan, but in the meantime has lost its Union Republics and has looser and rather tense relations (to put it mildly) with several countries, including Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan,  Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine and perhaps even Belarus. Nonetheless, Russia is still by far the largest country in the world, and will continue to be so (for some Russians, big is beautiful), even if or when more territory east of the Urals is taken or retaken by, or restored to, Big Brother, Big Sister, or, let’s say, Big Cousin China.)

The publishers of this brilliant text (easily the best and most detailed book on the last seven years of the USSR that I have read in any language) were kind enough to send me an uncorrected and incomplete proof copy of this book, albeit with the proviso that it is ‘not for quotation’, so I shall have to be brief. However, I owe it to potential purchasers to point out that the flier is incorrect when it claims that the text spans ‘the years from the coup itself to Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term of office in the early 2000s’. My copy goes up only to the end of 1991, so we must just hope that the dreadful developments in Russia once Yel’tsin and then Putin (representing the Kremlin and the Lubyanka during the neo-Soviet, neo-Cold War and the ensuing Hot War in and around Ukraine) replaced Gorbachov will be covered in Professor Service’s next book. The West as a whole and the USA in particular made a lot of terrible and tragic mistakes through misunderstanding the meaning of the coup and counter-coup in Moscow in August 1991. 

In the meantime, I have to admit now that (1) despite all his faults, Yel’tsin was not nearly as evil as Putin, and that (2) Gorbachev was not nearly as blameless in his relations with and attitudes towards Ukraine and Belarus as I thought at the time when he was in power. (Not that I had the slightest input into any Western policies towards the USSR.) Giving up much of any Empire, and doing so very quickly, as we all should know, is always an extremely painful experience. Most of the 24 chapters in this monograph make that very clear, and this reader could only sympathize with all those trying to control what was an extremely painful exercise in downsizing. What I hadn’t realized earlier was how strongly and persistently some of the Ukrainian leaders (notably Leonid Kravchuk) were pressing the Soviet leadership to be more accommodating to their demands even before Gorbachev came to power.

One very important question that Professor Service doesn’t address here is whether Yavlinsky’s proposals for economic reform in Russia would have yielded better results than did Gaidar’s. Not a single article or book by Yavlinsky is listed in the ten-page Bibliography, which strikes me as astonishing. However, as one of my most loved Russian friends was fond of saying, as far back as in 1960, in English, ‘even the sun has spots’. This book is a great achievement. 


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