Sergei Davidis

27 April – 1 May 2026

by Sergei Davidis

Source: Facebook

27 April 2026

An important and useful matter.

In Britain the premiere of a film featuring the last words in court of Russian antiwar prisoners will take place.

Many thanks to the filmmakers, participants, and organizers!

Ukraine Information Group (27 April 2026, Facebook):

Coming up on Sunday 17 May, 20.00 UK time: the Youtube premiere of the film version of TRY ME FOR TREASON: speeches by anti-war protesters in Russian courts. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, thousands of people have been arrested for protesting against the war. Many appear in court, facing years of imprisonment. What do they say to the judges? What would any of us say? This 50-minute film, in English, features some of the speeches. To watch the Premiere, go to this link and click “notify me”.

Source: Facebook

28 April 2026

Well…

Many years ago, I, like many others, said that due to its organic defects, which include the lack of feedback from society to the state and, moreover, of public oversight over power, the total suppression of any social and even economic initiative, the Putin regime is strategically uncompetitive and, ultimately, doomed.

But by inertia, without sudden movements, in the closed loop of the raw materials of dictatorship, this regime could exist for an unpredictably long time. Its main vulnerability was that, not encountering serious threats from within and having destroyed all feedback mechanisms, it most likely had to try to go beyond this system and face risks and threats beyond the realm of its control.

And so it was in 2022. However, the situation of an external war and a direct challenge to the existing world order only created enormous uncertainty and a challenge for the regime. The volume of accumulated resources, the scale of the country, the sociocultural background of society and the objective advantage of traditionalist authoritarianism over democracies in the tactical aspects of waging war gave the dictatorship a chance to manage this challenge.

First, the heroic courage and determination of the Ukrainians, and second, the responsible position of the majority of leaders of Western democracies and a great part of the societies of democratic countries prevented these tactical advantages of the dictatorship from being realized while this was still possible.

Today it is clear that this train has already left the station. Having failed to realize its tactical advantages quickly, now the further the Putin regime goes, the more it reaps the fruits of its strategic weaknesses. I am no specialist in military affairs, but it’s enough to read the self-explanatory lamentations of the Z-bloggers. Even these proponents of war and dictatorship are forced to admit that a vertical system without feedback loses to the blossoming complexity of democracy and the market. And the dictatorship has no realistic way to change this situation.

Having unleashed a war which, thank god, it could not win, the Putin regime committed not only a crime, which is obvious, but also made a mistake which, in the end, in all probability, will play a fatal role in its destiny.

The mole of history, as is well known, digs slowly, but now, in the fifth year of the war, when its duration has surpassed WWII with not even close to comparable formal (let alone moral and political) results, when Tuapse burns, Ukrainian missiles hit Votkinsk, and drones hit Tyumen and Yekaterinburg, statements that the SVO [‘Special Military Operation’ – ed.] goes according to plan invoke bitter irony even among the most ardent supporters of the war. The understanding that the Putin regime cannot win this war has become ubiquitous.

Everything else: Bonya’s performances, the fluctuations of Remeslo, the statements of Mironov and Zyuganov and much more that still remains to be seen, is the result of this understanding.

The pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. And this is very good. But this movement only provides a chance for Russia to turn towards democracy. It would be overconfident stupidity to say that the realization of this chance depends on us (us, engaged, immersed, committed, and, alas, for the most part, in exile), but to say that it does not depend on us would probably be no less stupid.

So now the choice of the content and methods of our interactions with Russian society inside the country acquires, to put it grandly, a momentous character.

The range of approaches to this interaction, from Bonya to Kasparov, is very wide. But this is a topic for a separate conversation.

Source: Facebook

1 May 2026

I see that many respected colleagues consider the suspension of Ruslan Kutaev from his work at the PACE Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces wrong.

The main argument against this decision, as I understand, is that the views expressed by Kutaev are really characteristic of a significant part of Chechen society (and probably not only Chechen), the bearers of these views are and can be allies in the fight against Russian dictatorship and aggression, and therefore it is necessary to engage in dialogue with them.

The argument is valid, but I believe there is an important flaw in the argumentation as a whole. Indeed, dialogue is necessary with practically anyone interested in such a dialogue, with whom there is some kind of subject for dialogue.

There is no doubt that there is a subject for dialogue with any social forces opposing Putin’s dictatorship and Putin’s war, and even those who disagree with them.

With those who hold traditional conservative social views, representing indigenous and small-numbered peoples, it exists in particular.

But the Platform is not just a platform for dialogue between just any anti-Putin and pro-Ukraine forces. This PACE Platform, and participation in dialogue within this platform, presupposes both meaningful, and formal, by virtue of the provisions of the resolution that established the Platform, basic agreement on a wide range of issues. It presupposes agreement with the values of human rights in general, and respect for the rights of minorities, and in particular, acceptance of the rule of law.

The theses put forward by Kutaev from the start clearly go beyond the scope of this agreement. Dialogue with the bearers of such views must be conducted, but in other spaces. I believe that for the very same reasons the Platform does not include representatives of the Russian Volunteer Corps, heroically fighting on the side of Ukraine against Putin’s aggression, dialogue and interaction with whom are undoubtedly necessary.

After Kutaev’s statements, which are clearly contradictory to PACE values, became a socially significant event, I believe the President of PACE did not have the opportunity to make another decision besides the one to suspend him.

As Ruslan Kutaev disavowed his initial statements, I presume that following the results of the proceedings, PACE leadership will restore his participation in Platform, but this is another issue.

And I would like to mention separately the amazing claims against the media, which provided Kutaev with a platform for his statements and attracted attention to them. Allegedly, in this way they repel and radicalize conservative Chechens, with whose voice Kutaev speaks.

Media should inform their audience in a balanced way, whenever possible, about the facts and their existing interpretations. Concern for the radicalization, or, conversely, appeasement of each of the infinite number of various national, religious, ideological, and other groups is generally not within the scope of their responsibilities.

Source: Facebook

Translated by Alyssa Rider